Human olfactory consciousness and cognition: its unusual features may not result from unusual functions but from limited neocortical processing resources by Richard J. Stevenson & Tuki Attuquayefio
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 01 November 2013
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00819
Human olfactory consciousness and cognition: its unusual
features may not result from unusual functions but from
limited neocortical processing resources
Richard J. Stevenson* and Tuki Attuquayefio
Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Edited by:
Andreas Keller, Rockefeller
University, USA
Reviewed by:
Aleksandra Mroczko-Wasowicz,
National Yang Ming University,
Taiwan
Kara C. Hoover, University of Alaska
Fairbanks, USA
*Correspondence:
Richard J. Stevenson, Department
of Psychology, Macquarie University,
Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia
e-mail: dick.stevenson@mq.edu.au
Human and animal olfactory perception is shaped both by functional demands and by
various environmental constraints seemingly peculiar to chemical stimuli. These demands
and constraints may have generated a sensory system that is cognitively distinct from the
major senses. In this article we identify these various functional demands and constraints,
and examine whether they can be used to account for olfaction’s unique cognitive features
on a case-by-case basis. We then use this as grounds to argue that specific conscious
processes do have functional value, a finding that naturally emerges when a comparative
approach to consciousness across the senses is adopted. More generally, we conclude
that certain peculiar features of olfactory cognition may owe more to limited neocortical
processing resources, than they do to the challenges faced by perceiving chemical stimuli.
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this manuscript is to explore two ideas. The first, and
the one that occupies the most space, is that in human olfaction
there are function-related reasons why consciousness and cog-
nition are instantiated in an unusual way relative to the major
senses (e.g., Herz and Engen, 1996; Zucco, 2003). To address this,
we start by reviewing the main parameters that govern olfactory
perception to identify and evaluate potential functional causes
of olfaction’s unusual features. This is followed by a case-by-case
examination of the major differences in olfactory consciousness-
related processing that have been identified in the literature.
Included within this section are three broad types of finding: (1)
differences in the content of consciousness (single vs. multiple
representations; primacy of affect; universal synesthesia); (2) dif-
ferences in attentional control and access (smell is a dual sense
but without dual awareness; failure to reinstate the representation
of a dishabituated smell); and (3) differences in conscious cor-
relates of post-perceptual processing (“imagery” and “rehearsal”
without conscious correlates). In each case we review the evidence
for the claim of “specialness” and follow this with an examina-
tion of how it might relate to olfactory function. The final part
of the manuscript examines the second idea, namely the value
associated with taking a comparative, cross-modal approach to
consciousness and cognition.
THE HUMAN OLFACTORY SYSTEM
The purpose of this section is to evaluate whether there are any
unusual or unique aspects of human olfaction, with respect to
stimulus and function that might explain its atypical psycho-
logical features. The olfactory system’s principal function is to
recognize the airborne (i.e., typically volatile) chemical corre-
lates of biologically significant events (e.g., Wilson and Stevenson,
2006). In humans, these biologically significant events primarily
relate to ingestion (e.g., detection of food), avoidance of environ-
mental hazards (e.g., gas leaks) and social communication (e.g.,
kin recognition; Stevenson, 2010). The avoidance of environmen-
tal hazards, and social communication, all rely on recognizing the
volatile chemical cues that are associated with these things—be
it a predator or a potential mate. Section Chemicals as Stimuli
(Chemicals as stimuli) considers whether the nature of the chem-
ical stimulus places any particularly unusual burdens upon the
brain.
While environmental hazards and social communication
mainly rely upon the recognition of volatile chemicals in the
external environment, ingestion-related olfaction brings with it
a more unique problem. This is because the olfactory system
has to associate events in the external world, namely the smell
of food, with events in the body, such as the taste of food in
the mouth and its delayed consequences—fullness, nausea etc.
Section The Special Demands Imposed by Eating (The special
demands imposed by eating) examines this particular problem.
CHEMICALS AS STIMULI
An important consideration when examining olfaction is to
understand the physical stimulus that the system has evolved to
detect (Hudson, 1999). Most chemical correlates of biological
events are complexmixtures composed of tens or hundreds of dif-
ferent chemical components (e.g., Maarse, 1991). These mixtures
contain varying amounts of each chemical, with the higher con-
centration components probably dominating perception (Weiss
et al., 2012). Nonetheless, multiple low concentration compo-
nents, even when each is below its own detection threshold, can
act together to generate a smell (Laska and Hudson, 1991). The
brain then has to recognize such multi-component mixtures, and
in addition it also has to deal with stimulus fidelity. Chemical
mixtures degrade in the environment through the effects of sun,
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rain and wind. In addition, there are many variations in the
chemical mixtures coming from any given class of emitter (e.g.,
prey odor may change with diet, age, gender, health status etc.).
In all of these cases the brain still needs to be able to recognize a
weakened or variant signal.
A further problem concerns the continued presence of the
same chemicals in one particular area. These may continue to
stimulate olfactory receptors potentially masking the detection of
new chemical events. Finally, and perhaps most importantly of
all, chemical stimuli are poorly placed to support a flexible com-
munication system. A flexible communication system is one in
which novel information (e.g., via combining existing signals) can
be transmitted and received in contrast to a fixed system where
particular signals communicate just one or a limited range of
meanings. While use of fixed chemical signals is a widespread
feature of many animal communication systems, including in
mammals (e.g., Broad and Keverne, 2008), chemicals cannot be
readily used to transmit information flexibly, in the way that light
and vibration can. A failure to support flexible communication is
perhaps one reason why olfaction has remained a relatively minor
sense in humans and in other higher mammals. And it is a minor
sense, even though it is a highly sensitive and discriminating one
(Yeshurun and Sobel, 2010). One reason for making such a claim
is that it is easier to live without smell (anosmia), than it is to
live without audition or vision. This can be seen in compensa-
tion provisions made by the AMA’s (1993)Guide to the Evaluation
of Permanent Impairment, which regards loss of smell as a 3%
impairment, relative to deafness at 35% and blindness at 85%.
While these figures cannot accurately reflect the full loss asso-
ciated with anosmia (e.g., Hummel and Nordin, 2005), they do
reflect the general distinction in utility between the major senses
and smell.
The biological system that has evolved to detect and recog-
nize volatile chemicals shares many features in common with
the systems used to detect visual and auditory stimuli (Wilson
and Stevenson, 2006). Thus, excepting the flexible communica-
tion issue, the problems outlined in the preceding paragraphs
for chemical stimuli are conceptually similar to those for electro-
magnetic or vibratory stimuli. Chemicals are detected in humans
by around 40 million olfactory receptor neurons located on the
olfactory epithelium (Cunningham et al., 1999). Each side of the
nose has its own discrete olfactory epithelium, which is positioned
inside the upper part of the nasal cavity lying mainly on the cribi-
form plate (Doty, 2001). Each olfactory receptor neuron expresses
one out of a large range of different G-protein coupled recep-
tor types (hereafter, odorant receptors; Buck and Axel, 1991). In
humans, there appear to be around 413 different odorant recep-
tors (Glusman et al., 2001; Olender et al., 2012). It is the odorant
receptor type that dictates the form of ligand that binds to each
olfactory receptor neuron.
Animal research suggests that odorant receptor types are quite
broadly tuned, so while maximally responsive to a group of
related chemicals, they will still fire to more distantly related ones,
especially at higher concentrations (Malnic et al., 1999). This is an
important observation, because when combined with the find-
ing that receptor neurons expressing the same odorant receptor
types converge to form structures called glomeruli (Ressler et al.,
1993), it suggests the basis for a pattern recognition system. That
is the spatial activation across the glomeruli, as well as changes in
activation over time, provide the input to a content addressable
recognitionmemory system located within primary olfactory cor-
tex (Haberly, 2001). Not only can a content addressable memory
system recognize complex patterns and learn new ones, it can also
recognize weakened and variant inputs. The primary olfactory
cortex has another feature, in that it stops responding to the same
receptor input very quickly, allowing it to filter out background
stimulation. This occurs even though there is relatively little alter-
ation in peripheral receptor input as measured in rodents (Wilson
and Linster, 2008). A similar picture is supported in humans, with
neuroimaging suggesting that primary olfactory cortex rapidly
adapts to continuous odorant stimulation (Sobel et al., 2000).
While having 400 or so different odorant receptor types is
clearly quite unlike vision or audition, the solution adopted to
recognizing discrete events in the chemical world is similar to
recognizing visual or auditory objects, namely a memory based
pattern recognition system (see Stevenson, 2013a). Olfaction then
is a system robustly capable of recognizing (and learning) com-
plex stimulus inputs (and weakened or varietal inputs), with
constant adjustment via habituation to maintain sensitivity to
change.
THE SPECIAL DEMANDS IMPOSED BY EATING
One of the most important functions of the olfactory system
concerns food selection (Hoover, 2010). This is especially so for
omnivores, who need to remember the nutritional value of many
different foods, and to avoid eating those that have made them
sick (Rozin, 1976). This requires the olfactory system to perform
an unusual feat. De novo, information about the nutritional value
of a potential food can only be obtained via oral sampling (i.e.,
taste and somatosensation) and digestion (i.e., from nutrient sig-
nals arising in the gut). If smell is to signal the nutritional value
of a food, then the body needs some way of detecting the smell of
food in the mouth (so that the correct odor is targeted), so that
this olfactory signal can then become associated with the food’s
nutritional value. A food’s smell alone can then come to signal
its potential nutrient value without the need for oral sampling
(e.g., Hiramatsu et al., 2009). For this reason the olfactory system
is able to perceive volatile chemical signals arising externally and
internally, in the latter case via a set of nostrils (nares) located at
the back of the throat (Mozell et al., 1969).
Smelling via the posterior nares (nostrils) in the throat is
termed retronasal olfaction, in contrast to sniffing through the
nose or anterior nares, which is termed orthonasal olfaction.
While retronasal chemical stimulation is detected and processed
in largely the same manner as orthonasal stimulation, it is not
normally accompanied by any conscious awareness that it is an
“olfactory” input. Instead, lay people refer to the sensory experi-
ence of eating and drinking as “taste” or “flavor” (Rozin, 1982;
noting that flavor is the preferred technical term). The olfactory
signals arising from food in the mouth can come to be associated
with both the food’s immediate (is it sweet, bitter, burning etc in
the mouth?) and delayed consequences (is it nutritious or poi-
sonous?; see Brunstrom, 2004). This enables the olfactory system
to provide, encapsulated within the smell percept, information
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about the nutritional correlates of a potential food (e.g., is it
energy dense?) when it is later encountered in the external world
and is being evaluated for consumption. This olfactory informa-
tion is then used tomake decisions about ingestion in both people
and animals (e.g., Hiramatsu et al., 2009). No other sense has this
dual system architecture.
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE HUMAN OLFACTORY SYSTEM
The argument advanced in this section is that while physiolog-
ically olfaction has some unique solutions to perceiving odors
(e.g., 350 different receptor types), the fundamental conceptual
basis of this process is similar to that of the major senses (see
Wilson and Stevenson, 2006; Stevenson, 2013a). Nonetheless,
two function-related differences emerge as potentially important.
One, which is highly distal, concerns the inflexibility of chemical
stimuli as a communication medium. This may have contributed
to olfaction remaining a minor sense in humans and other higher
mammals. The other, which is more proximal, concerns food.
Food choice requires the linking of external and internal events
and this may have introduced information processing approaches
unique to olfaction.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROCESSING IN OLFACTION AND
OTHER MODALITIES
In this section three types of processing differences are exam-
ined. The first concerns the content of olfactory consciousness,
which is used here to refer to both the nature of that content
and also its quantity (i.e., one or many percepts). This includes
the unitary and serial nature of odor percepts, the dominance of
affective processing and the presence of universal odor-induced
taste synesthesia. The second concerns attention, and examines
the dissociation between awareness of the content of conscious-
ness and the sense modality generating that content, and the
apparent absence of voluntary dishabituation. The third looks at
the role of conscious post-perceptual processing in olfactory cog-
nition (i.e., imagery and rehearsal). In each of these cases we start
by outlining the evidence and then examine how the difference
may relate to functional aspects of olfactory processing.
CONTENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Perceiving one smell at a time
In vision and audition, it has been argued that what can be expe-
rienced at any given moment exceeds what can be processed in
greater detail. This is best captured experimentally in a series
of studies reported by Sperling (1960). In a prototypical exper-
iment, participants were briefly presented with a grid of letters,
all of which they reported seeing. After the stimuli had van-
ished participants could only accurately recall a subset of the
viewed set. Similar distinctions between the apparent phenom-
enal wealth of visual experience, contrasted with the more limited
amount that can be accurately reported have now been observed
in many studies (e.g., Simons and Chabris, 1999; Simons and
Rensink, 2005). Block (2005, 2007) has described this succinctly
as “phenomenal content overflowing accessibility” with some-
what similar distinctions being drawn by other authors (Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001; Edelman, 2003). In olfaction, this does not
seem to be the case. Olfaction might be better characterized
as either “phenomenal content equals accessibility” or perhaps
“there is only accessible content.”
Many researchers have described olfactory experience as uni-
tary (e.g., Yeshurun and Sobel, 2010; but not all, see Auffarth,
2013). By this it seems they mean: (1) that an olfactory per-
cept cannot be readily broken into a set of parts; and (2) that
the whole has some sense of coherence. There is some support
for this type of definition. That odors cannot be readily decom-
posed into their component parts is suggested by an extensive
series of experiments reported by Laing and colleagues (e.g., Laing
and Glemarec, 1987; Livermore and Laing, 1996). In these stud-
ies participants were trained to identify particular odors. These
odors were then combined into mixtures of increasing complex-
ity and participants’ task was to identify which odor or odors were
present. A consistent finding has been that participants and even
industry experts (e.g., perfumists) cannot reliably detect more
than three odors in a mixture. This would seem to set one possible
upper limit on the content of olfactory consciousness.
This upper limit of around three may be unduly optimistic.
First, in these studies all of the participants were pre-trained to
identify the odors alone, suggesting that the default mode of pro-
cessing may be to treat “a smell” as precisely that—a singular “one
smell.” Second, the usual procedure adopted in these experiments
is to ask participants to determine if a particular component is
present in a mixture (i.e., a selective attention approach). What
this procedure cannot tell us is whether it is possible to seri-
ally scan an odor mixture (or indeed to experience all three at
once), and experience successively different percepts as each com-
ponent is recognized in turn. We investigated this possibility,
albeit indirectly, in a recent series of experiments using binary
odor mixtures (Stevenson and Mahmut, 2013a). When partic-
ipants experience a blend of two odors, there is evidence that
across the course of successive presentations, perception can shift
from that of a blend to perceiving mainly one component or the
other. What is striking about these results is that participants can-
not seemingly detect these transitions, even though evidence that
they have occurred can be found in their ratings. Even alerting
participants to the nature of the task does not improve aware-
ness. These results suggest that when a stimulus is smelled it is
perceived by default as a smell, and that even if it contains two
or more detectable components, these may be hard to notice over
successive exposures.
While detecting individual smells within an odor mixture
may represent one type of multidimensionality, it may not be
the only type. Odors can be characterized by their capacity to
remind people of other smells, a phenomenon termed redo-
lence (e.g., Dravnieks, 1982). How many they remind someone
of is partly a function of familiarity, with more familiar odors
being redolent of fewer smells than unfamiliar odors (Mingo and
Stevenson, 2007). How many odors a smell reminds one of is not
related to the chemical complexity of that odorant, as redolence
appears to be a psychological construct and a reliable one at that
even for odors that remind someone of many smells (Dravnieks,
1982). Redolence judgments normally occur when we are asked
to describe an odor, and so perhaps they normally follow per-
ception rather than accompany it (e.g., sniff then rate/describe).
If the content of consciousness is generally unitary (or perhaps,
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at a maximum, ternary), and if this is followed by redolence
judgments where the odor may remind us of many other odors
(i.e., more than three), then for olfaction what is accessible (per-
haps redolence judgments) at least equals and probably exceeds
conscious content.
Is it possible then to explain this seemingly unusual “content
of consciousness” with reference to the functional issues raised in
Section The Human Olfactory System? There does not seem to be
any obvious proximal function served by this form of “content
of consciousness.” Distal functional explanations may be more
promising, as limited content could be a product of the relatively
restricted neocortical processing resources devoted to olfaction
(Kaas, 2013). One way of instantiating this at the psychological
level of explanation would be to make odor selection (i.e., the
content of consciousness) an automatic procedure. A potential
implication of this would be that there is no phenomenal/access
distinction for olfaction, instead all we have is automatically man-
dated access consciousness. In vision and audition a combination
of exogenous and endogenous attentional processes dictate what
object or objects are selected for further processing, and certain
aspects of this are under volitional control (Sperling, 1960; Van
Rullen and Koch, 2003). Some limited volitional control may also
be evident in olfaction, notably during the search for a particular
odor (Zelano et al., 2011). However, this may differ substantially
from the major senses because for olfaction “searching” may only
work effectively if it happens to coincide with the olfactory sys-
tems built-in tendency to focus on chemicals that are new to the
search environment. Searching for a habituated odor may be inef-
fective, making the use of a conscious strategymore limited in this
sense.
The advantage of thinking about the content of olfactory con-
sciousness as being the result of an access only system, is that
it readily accounts for why its information content (in terms of
the number of objects which can become the focus of attention)
is relatively low when contrasted with the apparent phenomenal
richness of the major senses. It certainly does not have to be this
way as the brain undoubtedly processes a considerable amount
of information about the individual chemical components of an
odor, and this could go to make a rich phenomenal experience,
perhaps as it does in the major senses. However, for olfaction
this information does not seem to be consciously accessible (e.g.,
Gottfried et al., 2006).
The primacy of affect
Engen noted that “Functionally, smell may be to emotion what
sight or hearing are to cognition” (Engen, 1982, p. 3). It should
not be surprising then given Engen’s quote that an important
aspect of olfactory experience is the hedonic tone that accom-
panies smelling. Some researchers have even argued that the
affective response to a smell actually reflects the primary response,
being more important than perceptually based means of recogni-
tion (Yeshurun and Sobel, 2010). While this strong claim may be
unlikely, partly because recent experimental work indicates that
recognition-related processes occur before hedonic judgments
(Olofsson et al., 2012), there is good support for the idea that
affect is a more central part of the olfactory experience than it is
for vision or audition. One important line of evidence has come
from multidimensional scaling experiments, which can be used
to determine the underlying dimensions that mediate similarity
judgments. A consistent finding in this literature has been that the
primary dimension is typically hedonic (e.g., Schiffman, 1974).
Another line of evidence comes from examining olfactory mem-
ories, which have been found to be more emotionally evocative
than memories retrieved by comparable visual or auditory cues
(e.g., Herz, 2004). Finally, an analysis of olfactory related words
reveals them to be on average more affect laden, with unpleasant
terms outnumbering pleasant terms, relative to words associated
with vision or audition (Ehrlichman and Bastone, 1992).
While affect seems to be a central part of the olfactory expe-
rience, it has been noted that if people are asked to provide a
list of their most affect-laden experiences, smells will not gen-
erally figure high on this list (Ehrlichman and Bastone, 1992).
Rather visual and auditory experiences will tend to dominate in
seeming contradiction to the arguments presented above. What
seems to be special about olfaction is that the object that causes
the smell seems to actively contact the body, that is it seems to
be phenomenologically more proximal than vision or audition
(e.g., Rouby and Bensafi, 2002). So the hedonics for smell feels
more direct and visceral than the hedonics associated with vision
and audition. This is best illustrated by the emotion of disgust.
This emotion is frequently triggered by smell, probably because
volatile chemicals are often a good cue for disease-related objects
and events (Oaten et al., 2009). A characteristic feature of disgust
is that contact with an elicitor of this emotion feels contaminating
(e.g., Sherman et al., 2012), thereby compelling movement away
from the object (Rozin and Fallon, 1987). While we might dislike
looking at fake dog feces or plastic vomit, synthetic fecal or vomit
odors still compel avoidance even if we know they are not real.
Such smells just feel bad.
Functionally, it has been presumed that the primacy of affect
reflects the need for rapid withdrawal or approach, without the
need for (presumably) longer cognitive appraisal (Yeshurun and
Sobel, 2010). Perhaps there is some merit in this idea when
it is applied in the context of ingestive behavior, where detec-
tion of microbial contaminants or natural poisons, may require
rapid rejection of a food from the mouth before it is swallowed.
However, this particular set of circumstances would be rare,
because if an off-smell were detectable in the mouth, it would
almost certainly be detectable by the nose prior to ingestion.
More generally, we seem well able to avoid dangerous situations
when they are revealed to us by vision or audition (e.g., a loom-
ing object, avoiding road traffic, fire alarms etc.), suggesting that
negative affect is not a necessary prerequisite for rapid with-
drawal. That people can effectively avoid dangerous situations
using non-affective means implies that affect-based processing
is not uniquely effective in this regard. It could then be that the
affect that routinely accompanies olfactory experience is actually
just the product of economical cognition resulting from limited
neocortical resources (i.e., no or limited relative to the other
senses, dedicated unimodal neocortical tissue). Thus, this posi-
tion contrasts with the idea that affect generation confers some
special advantage over cognition in terms of promoting faster or
more effective avoidance (although the bad contamination “feel”
of olfactory disgust elicitors may be something special).
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Universal synesthesia
While it has been known for many years that people routinely
describe certain food odors as smelling of particular tastes (e.g.,
Harper et al., 1968), the unusual nature of these observations
only started to attract attention relatively recently (e.g., Frank and
Byram, 1988). Importantly, pure tastants do not trigger smell sen-
sations (noting that tastants are often contaminated by volatile
chemicals; Mojet et al., 2005), it is only smell sensations that can
seem to trigger both smell and taste sensations even if they have
no contact with taste receptors (e.g., Sakai et al., 2001). A fur-
ther issue is that taste is a discrete sensory system from smell.
Taste receptors are located mainly on the tongue and they send
information to the brain via a different route to that of smell
(Schiffman, 2002). Smell and taste information first converge in
the brain, in secondary neocortical structures (Rolls, 1999). To say
then that something smells “sweet, sour, bitter, salty or meaty” is
directly akin to saying that visual objects routinely trigger sound
sensations and vice versa (e.g., a telephone looks ringing).
While synesthesia has typically been explored in the context
of the relatively rare individuals with grapheme-color synesthesia
(e.g., Mroczko et al., 2009) or some other variant (e.g., lexical-
gustatory synesthesia; Ward et al., 2005), a notable aspect of
odor-induced tastes is that they seem to be experienced by every-
one (Stevenson and Tomiczek, 2007). Although there are simi-
larities between these rare synesthesias and odor-induced tastes,
especially in the stability of these experiences over time, their
automaticity and involuntariness, there are also differences. The
most important seems to be the largely idiosyncratic nature of
many synesthetic inducer-concurrent mappings (i.e., why should
the letter A induce red color?; Deroy and Spence, 2013).
There are several possible mechanisms that could account for
odor-induced tastes. One obvious one is that the use of taste-
based terms to describe food odors could be metaphorical (e.g.,
people are sometimes described using taste-based terms). This
appears unlikely. The most obvious metaphor is for affect as with
saying someone is sweet. Several studies have now shown that
odor-induced taste experiences are dissociable from odor hedo-
nics (e.g., Yeomans and Mobini, 2006). A further and related
alternative is that people simply employ taste terms for odors
that they know explicitly are associated with particular tastes—in
other words it is a purely verbal/semantic association (smell-
knowledge). Several pieces of evidence speak against it being
a verbal/semantic phenomenon: (1) odor-taste associations can
be acquired implicitly, in the absence of explicit verbalisable
knowledge of the odor-taste pairings (e.g., Stevenson et al., 1998;
Brunstrom, 2004); (2) odor induced taste characteristics are reli-
ably present even when participants are unable to identify the
odor in question (e.g., Stevenson et al., 2012); (3) odors that
induce particular taste sensations have physiological effects that
parallel those observed when experiencing an actual gustatory
experience (Prescott andWilkie, 2007); and (4) a growing body of
evidence indicates that odors can induce taste experiences in ani-
mals, and that these are acquired in the same way as in humans
(e.g., Harris and Thein, 2005; Gautam and Verhagen, 2010).
While metaphorical or verbal-semantic mediation accounts can-
not be wholly excluded as explanations of odor-induced tastes,
they seem unlikely.
A further explanation is that certain odors can activate brain
regions also active during tasting, resulting in a taste-like experi-
ence that is highly perceptually similar to the experience induced
by tastants on the tongue (e.g., the sweetness of sucrose on the
tongue). That is odor-induced tastes arise from odor-taste associ-
ations that are based upon a link between these two percepts, such
that the odor percept comes to activate the taste percept. This con-
clusion has emerged from nearly 20 years of research. Key findings
include the observation that: (1) odors that smell of a particular
taste can enhance the intensity of that tastant when they are added
to it (e.g., Frank and Byram, 1988); (2) odors acquire taste-like
properties via associative learning during flavor perception (e.g.,
Stevenson et al., 1998); (3) odors that smell of a particular taste
facilitate identification of that taste (White and Prescott, 2007);
(4) tastants that taste the same as an odor smells, facilitate the
detection of that smell (e.g., Dalton et al., 2000); and (5) patients
with centrally based taste impairments also have selective impair-
ments in perceiving odor-induced tastes (e.g., Stevenson et al.,
2008). Together with many other supportive findings not sum-
marized here (see, Stevenson, 2012), these findings suggest that
odors can induce taste-like sensations.
It has been suggested that the function of odor-induced taste
is to assist in identifying prospective foods, so as to aid prediction
of their likely taste in the mouth (Stevenson and Tomiczek, 2007).
Currently, and as in our evolutionary past, human food selection
is heavily dependent upon color vision, as it is in our fruit-eating
primate ancestors where it evolved (Regan et al., 2001). Detecting
a food’s likely taste via smell is an adaptation that may have had
much greater functional significance for animals less reliant on
vision (although as in humans it may well augment visual deci-
sion making; Hiramatsu et al., 2009), especially rodents. Indeed,
rodents can perceive “tasty-smells” just as we can (e.g., Gautam
and Verhagen, 2010) and so our ability in this regard may rep-
resent the conservation of a function, which no longer confers a
major benefit (beyond, perhaps, providing an insight into what it
might be like to experience smell like a rat; Nagel, 1974).
Conclusion to content of consciousness
Olfactory conscious experience appears to be mainly singular
with one odor event perceived at a time. The large array of objects
potentially available to visual attention during perception con-
trasts with the more limited range available to smell. An odor will
be redolent of other odors, it will be affectively toned, and if per-
ceived before in a food, it will probably have taste-like qualities.
The olfactory percept seems to directly encapsulate its mean-
ing (especially taste, affect), and it does so with minimal effort,
notwithstanding the making of redolence ratings. While visual
and auditory percepts also contain considerable inherent infor-
mation (e.g., depth, location, color, etc) they do not normally
contain sense experience drawn from another modality (a quan-
titative difference). In addition, visual and auditory percepts are
not usually accompanied by the visceral feel of affective contact (a
more qualitative difference).
It might in theory be possible to explain these differences
by reference to the demands and constraints of the olfactory
system. However, there does not seem any compelling connec-
tion between the demands and constraints identified in Section
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The human olfactory system, and the unusual characteristics of
human olfactory conscious content. Instead, we suggest that most
of the differences in conscious content may be explained by ref-
erence to olfaction’s limited neocortical processing resources, the
exception being odor-induced tastes, which may be a vestige (but
still useful) of a once more adaptive food selection system. In the
main, the processing differences examined in this section may
reflect particularly economical forms of perception, cognition,
and consciousness.
ATTENTIONAL PROCESSING
Mouth and nose
Odorants access the olfactory receptors either orthonasally via the
nostrils on the face, or retronasally via the internal nostrils at the
back of the throat during eating and drinking. One important
distinction that has emerged here is that between content and
modality awareness (Rozin, 1982; Stevenson, 2013b). When an
odor is smelled at the nose, a person knows both that an odor-
ant is present and that the sensory system involved is smell. When
an odor is sensed in the mouth as part of a food (retronasally),
alongside the anatomically discrete senses of taste and somatosen-
sation (mouth feel), the person is capable of perceiving retronasal
odor quality, intensity and hedonic properties. However, this is
not routinely accompanied by an awareness of the sense modality
(olfaction) involved in its perception (Stevenson, 2009a). While
this may apply to naïve participants (as for most of the discussion
below), it is likely that experts do have an awareness of olfac-
tion’s role in flavor, but this topic has not been well explored. For
naïve participants then, sense experience in themouth is routinely
described as flavor or more colloquially as “taste,” but not as smell
(note that “taste” in single quotes refers here to the colloquial term
for flavor, while taste refers to gustation).
The evidence for a dissociation of content andmodality aware-
ness in themouth is quite strong, although it has not received a lot
of contemporary research attention. Rozin (1982) asked partici-
pants which term they would use to describe a range of different
foodstuffs, including several that had significant olfactory com-
ponents. He found that the terms “taste” and flavor were used
interchangeably, although flavor tended to be used more when
the item had a greater olfactory component. Rozin (1982) also
observed that of all of the major language groups that he had
searched, none, including English, had a word that meant “smell
in the mouth” (note, however, that experts clearly do have a term
for this distinction—retronasal olfaction—although its meaning
would probably be unknown tomost naïve participants). Another
manifestation of the content modality dissociation is seen in peo-
ple who have lost their sense of smell. When people first present
with this problem, they frequently complain of experiencing both
a loss smell and “taste” (Deems et al., 1991). Upon examination it
is evident that taste is intact, rather food now “tastes” bland as a
consequence of the loss of smell.
While participants may attribute the portion of their sensory
experience of food that rightly belongs to olfaction, to “taste,” the
olfactory content of that experience is clearly perceived (Small
et al., 2005). The olfactory component of food is a major fac-
tor in our enjoyment of eating and drinking, as is made evident
when one has a cold and retronasal olfaction becomes impaired.
More formal psychophysical tests of peoples ability to identify
particular odors in the mouth reveal a capacity to do so that is
similar but somewhat poorer than the capacity at the nose (e.g.,
Marshall et al., 2006). The food industry clearly believes that
people can experience smells in their mouth. They spend large
sums of money on sensory evaluation panels that reliably judge
many purely olfactory attributes of food, which result from the
release of volatiles during eating and drinking (Moskowitz and
Hartmann, 2008).
One way to consider these findings is to regard taste and smell
in the mouth as one perceptual system—taste (but one could
equally use the term flavor)—as originally suggested by James
Gibson (1966). Gibson’s idea can be operationalized by consid-
ering taste and smell as having a shared attentional channel in the
mouth (Stevenson, 2013b). Although this dual-channel account
has not been well investigated, it is consistent with two important
findings. First, it does not seem possible to attend to a smell in the
mouth without also attending to a co-present taste and vice versa,
suggesting that both these senses are entwined (e.g., Ashkenazi
and Marks, 2004). Second, if an odor is sniffed at the nose and a
taste is placed in the mouth, the presence of the taste can gener-
ate an illusory transfer of the location of the odor from nose to
mouth (Stevenson et al., 2011). That is the orthonasal smell now
appears to be part of a flavor in the mouth. This phenomenon
does not occur if an odor is sniffed at the nose and a tasteless
somatosensory stimulus is placed in the mouth instead (e.g., a
viscous fluid). Together, these findings suggest a special connec-
tion between taste and smell that is not shared between smell and
oral somatosensation.
Functionally, a case can be made for the idea that the brain
needs to connect olfactory information arising in the mouth with
olfactory events in the environment so as to aid smell-based food
selection (now or at least in the past). Irrespective of whether
this view is correct, it still leaves the problem as to the benefit,
if any, served by not knowing that smells in the mouth are smells.
We suggest two possibilities. One is that it may be more efficient
to learn the relationship between a food and its immediate and
delayed consequences, if this information is automatically associ-
ated (i.e., within an attentional channel, rather than associations
between channels). One consequence of this may be evidence of
learning even in the face of contradictory explicit knowledge (e.g.,
falsely associating the nausea from cancer chemotherapy with a
food, but knowing the food was not responsible; Bernstein, 1985).
A second possibility is that there may have been no evolution-
ary pressure for awareness of smells in the mouth, and so we
just retain an information processing system that predates a con-
scious reflective component, which is usually deemed necessary
for human associative learning (e.g., Shanks, 2010).
Re-attending to smell
In many respects, olfaction shares with vision and audition basic
aspects of attentional processing (Keller, 2011). Strong, unpleas-
ant or novel odors may involuntarily attract our attention, and
we can selectively attend to the olfactory modality, enhancing our
reaction time to events in this channel (e.g., Spence et al., 2001).
One reason to suspect that attentional processing differences do
exist comes from the unusual neural architecture of olfaction
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(Smythies, 1997). Unlike the major senses, which route all incom-
ing information via the thalamus, the olfactory system is unique
in having two routes to neocortex, a thalamic relay and a direct
link (Tham et al., 2009). Thus, the olfactory systemmay be able to
transmit information to the neocortex independently of the thala-
mus. This is important because the thalamus has been presumed
to play a key role in attentional processing in the major senses
(e.g., Portas et al., 1998).
Recent work has suggested that at least one particular aspect
of attentional processing may be different for smell. As described
earlier, the olfactory primary cortex undergoes a rapid reduc-
tion in neural response to continued chemical stimulation (e.g.,
Sobel et al., 2000). The presumed reason for this is so that the
system is ready and able to detect new odorants as they arise.
Importantly, this process of adjustment is principally a cortical
change (or more properly a paleocortical one), and not a loss of
sensitivity at the receptor level. In fact animal work shows con-
vincingly that olfactory receptors retain sensitivity to an odorant
that no longer generates any neural response in primary olfac-
tory cortex (Wilson and Linster, 2008). The cortical locus of this
reduced responsivity, combined with retained receptor sensitiv-
ity, suggests that it may be termed habituation (i.e., a brain-based
phenomenon) rather than sensory adaptation (i.e., a receptor-
based phenomenon), a division long recognized in the literature
(Thompson and Spencer, 1966). In the major senses it is relatively
easy to voluntarily attend to stimuli that are habituated. In the
classic example of the ticking clock, one can voluntarily attend to
the sound, but as attention is drawn to other stimuli the ticking
again appears to pass out of consciousness (James, 1890).
This does not seem to be the case for the olfactory system
as an experiment recently conducted in our laboratory suggests
(Mahmut and Stevenson, submitted). Participants were placed in
an odorized room and asked to describe its smell using redolence
and certainty ratings. One group was then continuously exposed
to the smell, but only in one nostril (this being counterbal-
anced across participants), the other nostril being blocked (recall
that each side of the nose has its own discrete olfactory epithe-
lium). Performance, in this group of subjects of their open nostril
reflects the effects of peripheral adaptation and central habit-
uation, while performance in their blocked nostril just reflects
central habituation, which is bilateral (Cain, 1977). The other
group of participants had both nostrils blocked, so as to equate
exposure created when participants removed the nose plugs to
make ratings of the room’s odor. After a period of around 20min
exposure, we asked both groups to again describe the room’s
smell using redolence and certainty ratings. The key result is in
the group that had just one nostril blocked, with the other open
throughout exposure. When we tested the nostril that had been
blocked throughout exposure, they were unable to describe the
room’s smell when their attention was directed toward it, relative
to the way they had at the start of the experiment. This reflects the
effect of centrally based habituation, as this nostril (and its asso-
ciated receptors) had minimal prior exposure to the odor, and so
no sensory adaptation should have occurred. Participants in the
other group, who previously had both nostrils blocked, were still
able to describe the odor in the same way as they had at the start
of the experiment (i.e., no receptor adaptation or habituation).
In sum, participants asked to attend to a centrally habituated odor
seemed unable to voluntarily recover its conscious representation.
As we noted earlier, the olfactory system has to detect new
odorants against the background of currently present odorants,
and habituation may play a significant role in this process (not-
ing that the persistence of one odorant will not necessarily block
perception of another). While it would be tempting to describe
failure to re-attend to a habituated odor as a consequence of keep-
ing the olfactory system optimized to detect the advent of new
odorants, this explanation seems inadequate. This is because all
of the major senses face a similar problem of constant stimula-
tion against which new events have to be detected, and all of them
also show habituation (Thompson and Spencer, 1966). However,
re-attending to habituated stimuli is still possible in the major
senses (James, 1890). Perhaps then it is the nature of the chemical
stimulus, which somehow precludes our ability to re-attend to a
habituated odor, but it is not obvious why this would be so either.
An alternative perspective based again on limited neocortical pro-
cessing resources (see Section Mouth and Nose) may be needed.
It is, we suggest, the absence of dedicated neocortical processing
that prevents us from re-experiencing a habituated smell.
Conclusion to attentional processing
The division of olfaction into a sense of smell at the nose, where
we are aware of both the modality and content, and a sense
of “taste or flavor,” where we are aware of content, but not
modality, is probably an attentional phenomenon (Stevenson,
2013b). We suggested this might arise because either it is a
more efficient means of learning or because it may be that
this form of information processing has simply remained con-
served over evolutionary history. The second attentional processes
examined in this section concerned attending to a habituated
odor. This can be conceptualized, as with our discussion of
perceiving one smell at a time (Section Mouth and Nose), as
being a further consequence of automatic stimulus selection,
which in turn may result from limited neocortical processing
resources.
POST-PERCEPTUAL PROCESSING
In the visual and auditory domains it is generally accepted that:
(1) people can rehearse sounds or images in domain-specific
working memory modules (respectively the visuo-spatial scratch
pad and the articulatory loop); and (2) that these short-term
memory processes are intimately connected with the capac-
ity for conscious visual and auditory imagery (Baddeley and
Andrade, 2000; Postma and Barsalou, 2009). The olfactory lit-
erature on these topics presents a far more complex and seem-
ingly confusing picture. First, after decades of disagreement, it
now appears that trying to imagine an odor does have several
detectable consequences: (1) it activates brain regions, includ-
ing primary processing areas, which are also active during real
smelling (e.g., Djordjevic et al., 2005); (2) it improves various psy-
chological capacities, such as enhancing the detection of threshold
level odors (Djordjevic et al., 2004) and priming (Tomiczek and
Stevenson, 2009); (3) it mimics various psychophysical parame-
ters, relating to olfactory interactions, intensity and quality (e.g.,
Carrasco and Ridout, 1993); and (4) it generates olfactomotor
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responses (sniffing behavior) that closely approximate what is
observed during actual smelling (e.g., Bensafi et al., 2003). While,
a number of studies have failed to find improved psychological
capacities (e.g., Crowder and Schab, 1995) or mimicking of psy-
chological effects observed with real odors (e.g., Herz, 2000), the
weight of evidence suggests that trying to imagine a smell can
influence a variety of psychological, physiological and neural vari-
ables, in much the same way as actual smelling can. However,
what is at issue here is whether these various effects, which result
from trying to imagine an odor, are mediated or accompanied by
a conscious representation of the imagined smell. We suggest they
are not.
There are several reasons for thinking that trying to form a
conscious odor image, or for that matter attempting to rehearse
an odor representation in some form of “mind’s nose,” may not
normally occur. The most obvious reason for doubting that it
does comes from simply asking people what they experience
when they try to form mental images in different modalities.
In all of the studies that we are aware of olfaction is either
reported as the modality in which it is most difficult to imag-
ine a perceptual event (e.g., Betts, 1909; Ashton and White,
1980) or it is the modality where participants most frequently
report being unable to form any sort of conscious image (e.g.,
Brower, 1947; Lawless, 1997). These findings do not seem to
reflect a broader failure to be able to notice olfactory experi-
ences in the absence of appropriate stimulation. Indeed, there is a
large literature documenting reports of olfactory hallucinations
in people who are not psychotic, but who experience epilepsy,
brain tumors and migraine for example (see Stevenson and Case,
2005; Stevenson and Langdon, 2012). So when people say they
cannot experience an odor image or that it is vague or indis-
tinct, there seems no obvious reason to doubt the validity of their
reports.
A further line of evidence concerns the relationship between
psychological and psychophysical performance measures
obtained during odor imagery experiments, and self-reports of
imagery ability. For visual imagery there are well-established
links between these two types of variable (e.g., McDermott and
Roediger, 1994; Baddeley and Andrade, 2000). In olfaction, the
links between the two appear to be weak at best. Djordjevic et al.
(2004) failed to find a correlation between self-report ability and
performance on their detection task, although this relationship
did emerge when tested just in females. In fact Lyman and
McDaniel (1990) are the only group to report a significant cor-
relation between imagery and task performance, but this study
has been criticized, as it is unclear whether the reported imagery
performance was mediated by verbal codes (see Stevenson and
Case, 2005). Other studies have failed to find any link with per-
formance, including Lyman (1988), and Tomiczek and Stevenson
(2009). The latter study explored in some detail the predictors
of enhanced imagery performance. Participants reported ability
to consciously experience an odor image was not found to be a
predictor in any of their three experiments. We suggest based
on these findings that while there may be good evidence that
attempting to imagine an odor can generate a number of effects
that broadly parallel real smelling, the evidence that these are
accompanied by a conscious image is weak at best. This does not
seem to be the case in the major senses, and it is possible that it
may not be the case in olfactory experts either, although the evi-
dence basis for this assertion is currently too small to be definitive
(see Royet et al., 2013).
A similar picture also emerges in the olfactory short-term
memory literature. Yet again, there is good evidence that there is
a capacity for short-term memory in olfaction (e.g., White, 1998;
Andrade and Donaldson, 2007). What is not clearly established
is the representational code that underpins this, and whether it
is instantiated discretely (i.e., a short-term olfactory module) or
as a component of long-termmemory (e.g., Yeshurun et al., 2008;
Johnson andMiles, 2009). Evidence that one can hold a conscious
representation of an odor in short-term memory once the stim-
ulus had been removed, and perhaps even rehearse this image, is
scarce. One potential line of evidence is the presence of primacy
effects in the serial position curve, but these have not generally
been found for olfactory stimuli (e.g., Miles and Hodder, 2005).
Another concerns the two-back task (i.e., is the current stimulus
the same as the one smelt before the last one?), which may require
some form of active rehearsal to maintain and update working
memory. Although olfactory performance on this task seems to
depend heavily on participants naming the odor, there is evidence
to suggest that the two-back task can be performed even when the
odor is unfamiliar and thus likely to be difficult to name (Jonsson
et al., 2011). There is then as yet little evidence that odors can
be consciously rehearsed in some form of olfactory short-term
store.
Based upon current evidence, it looks as if there might be a
dissociation between an operational capacity for short-term stor-
age, imagery and rehearsal, and an associated conscious state.
That is, these cognitive operations do not seem to be routinely
accompanied by a conscious representation. One possible func-
tional benefit of such a conscious-less cognition is that it precludes
troublesome interference between detection of odors new to that
environment and any on-going cognitive operation. However,
this appears a weak argument. First, in general, people do not
seem to try and remember odorants, imagine them or whatever.
While of course this may be because they cannot do so, there
would not appear to be much day-to-day call for most of us to
try and do so. Second, the major senses seem able to manage
imagery-reality confusions, except where these are deliberately
engineered to confuse participants by making the real stimulus
weak (e.g., Segal and Fusella, 1971; Mathews et al., 2013). Of
course it could be that because olfactory percepts are somewhat
less vivid than the other senses (e.g., Cain and Algom, 1997),
this has prevented the development of imagery-related processing
(i.e., because if an imagery capacity evolved it led to fatal confu-
sions between imagination and reality). If this were correct, then
this in turn would raise the question as to why olfactory percepts
are less vivid or weak. Answering this question would probably
lead to the same conclusion as the one that prompted this discus-
sion (i.e., absent conscious processing of imagery and rehearsal).
That is olfaction seems to have this feature not because it faces a
unique set of challenges, but because it has access to only limited
neocortical resources. These limited resources produce tangible
effects, one of which may be cognition with minimal conscious
representation.
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DISCUSSION
The main idea explored in this manuscript is that there
are function-related reasons for the way in which conscious-
ness and cognition are configured in human olfaction. In an
earlier examination of olfaction’s unusual psychological features,
Stevenson (2009b) implied that proximal functional factorsmight
be responsible, but he did not explore this issue in any depth. In
the current article, which addresses this more directly, it would
seem that many of the problems that the olfactory system has
to solve to meet its basic function (e.g., recognizing biologically
significant chemical mixtures) are in fact common to all of the
senses. Even a relatively unique problem, such as the persistence
of chemical stimuli in the environment, should not unduly con-
strain cognition. For example, the somatosensory system faces a
similar problem of stimulus persistence (e.g., clothes), but this
does not seem to preclude turning attention back to the way,
for example, of how ones clothes feel. This does not seem to
be the case for olfaction. Before turning to the more general
explanation advanced here, it is important to note that at least
one class of proximal function, unique to olfaction, does seem
to have explanatory power. This is the need to link the imme-
diate and delayed consequences of ingestion with the smell of
food. This may have contributed to three unusual aspects of
olfactory cognition, namely the primacy of affect, odor-induced
tastes, and the lack of modality awareness for odors in the mouth.
Notwithstanding, even these function-related features may be
of lesser current value since the advent of color vision and the
allocation of neocortical resources to this sense in our primate
ancestors.
The main argument to emerge from this review is that many
of olfaction’s unusual features may be attributed to its limited
allocation of neocortical resources. The capacities olfaction does
have result then from its primary processing by many limbic sys-
tem structures, with its paleocortical and subcortical centers. We
have further suggested that the failure of olfaction to take space in
the burgeoning neocortex of primates and early hominoids may
have come about because chemicals represent a poor medium
for flexible communication. The rapid expansion of neocorti-
cal tissue in our human ancestors left olfaction languishing as
a minor sense (Kaas, 2013), without the need for the neocorti-
cal resources necessary to support the manipulation of units of
sensory meaning, and their formation into ideas to communi-
cate within the brain and between people. Importantly, this is
not to say that olfaction is incapable of transmitting informa-
tion. Olfaction represents information affectively, and can trigger
powerful emotional states (e.g., disgust), and this can be commu-
nicated within the brain and to others (e.g., via facial expression).
Nonetheless, this communicative capacity is considerably less
flexible than one where perception, semantic memory and verbal
thought are highly interconnected, as they are for all of the major
senses (Revonsuo, 1999). One place this can be seen clearly is in
the very well documented problem that most people have in nam-
ing even common odorants in the absence of visual or auditory
cues (e.g., Cain et al., 1998). Another is the limited access they
have to semantic memory systems in the absence of a name (e.g.,
Stevenson and Mahmut, 2013b). There is no doubt that olfaction
is an effective sensory system, but it is a highly limited one relative
to all of the other neocortical dependent perceptual systems
that we possess.
The claim of limited neocortical resources is not as un-testable
as it may at first seem. In a novel line of work, Plailly et al.
(2012) have been exploring how olfactory perceptual expertise
induces various types of functional reorganization of the brain.
It may be that extensive practice can produce increases in neocor-
tical processing power for smell, sufficient to propel what may
be unconscious processes in naïve participants into conscious
ones for experts. This is certainly what the experts’ claim (e.g.,
Gilbert et al., 1998) and interestingly this seems to be accompa-
nied by the creative use of these cognitive operations to imagine
new perfumes or flavors and communicate these ideas to other
professionals.
This leads to the second idea we wanted to explore in this
manuscript, namely how cross-modal comparisons can be valu-
able in pointing to the functional benefits that accrue from
conscious processing. First, we suggest that the fact that many
successful olfactory operations can seemingly occur without con-
scious awareness, while being potentially conscious in the major
senses, seems to imply that consciousness has a function (i.e.,
if it has not, why not stick with an olfaction-like conscious-
less information processing system?). Second, we suggest that
one benefit of conscious processing is the availability of this
information for further manipulation, typically for creative and
communicative ends. Not surprisingly, it is with this end in
mind that the long training period that accompanies olfactory
expertise is aimed, and the ability to control what information
is combined or contrasted with other information seems to be
a hallmark of conscious processing in vision and audition, and
one that is typically lacking in olfaction—except perhaps in
experts.
To us, the most striking differences between olfaction and the
major senses is in the content of consciousness itself. Here olfac-
tion has far more limited content than the major senses. One
argument we make is to suggest that the content of olfactory
consciousness may be limited because all we can experience is
the access component. On this basis we do not have phenom-
enal olfactory consciousness, which is perhaps a consequence
of information processing in paleocortical tissue. Perhaps then
paleocortical tissue cannot support conscious representations,
and while there is evidence that could be mustered favoring
this possibility [e.g., notably the temporal aspects of conscious
content when smelling seem more correlated with secondary
olfactory cortex (orbitofrontal neocortex) than they do with pri-
mary olfactory paleocortex (the piriform cortex)], it again points
to the interesting possibilities that can emerge when contrast-
ing the senses. Finally, there are now many theories that claim
to explain different aspects of conscious processing. While it
is beyond the scope of this manuscript to evaluate them all
with respect to olfaction, we want to end by pointing out how
valuable this might be. Here, we have focused on the phenom-
enal/access distinction. However one chooses to interpret the
data mustered in this article, they do suggest that the phe-
nomenal/access distinction is not the same for olfaction as it is
for the major senses. Examining other theories may be equally
revealing.
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